Originally published: 1959
176 pages | Chapter
17
UP FROM LIBERALISM
William F. Buckley, Jr. |
What all conservatives in this country fear is the loss of freedom
by attrition. |
This is the starting point for William F. Buckley, Jr.'s observations and
commentary on the state of activist conservatism in the late 1950s. What
makes this volume so valuable today is how accurately Buckley sees the
future from his then-youthful vantage point. Moreover, he does not fear to
submit his views to public inspection. Observing Buckley's success, which
was far from assured when he began his quest, we see a quintessential
example of why not to be reticent about expressing one's opinions no matter
how far afield our views may seem when judged in the light of "common
knowledge" or "accepted wisdom." Buckley demonstrates by
exposing his own ideas to public scrutiny how flimsy the wisdom of
entrenched ideas often becomes.
The global view of both politics and culture has
changed dramatically in the half century since Buckley took center stage in
an attempt to reorder not just American politics, but American society. To
reduce the myriad changes he suggests to a single concept is relatively
easy: most of what has been transformed or accomplished in the last fifty
years revolves around the notion of responsibility. Most of what has been
removed or refigured revolves about the notion of entitlement.
Buckley intends to have us look at our
responsibilities if for no other reason than at the time this book was
written we as a nation and a society of individuals were beginning not to do
so. Conversely, then (as now) almost everyone was happy to talk about their
rights. That
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political rhetoric and policy had been turned upside down since
the turn of the twentieth century was apparent. These changes found their
genesis in the economic disaster of the Great Depression. Up From
Liberalism doesn't address everything that it might in these arenas, but
its incisive delineation of how to move forward in a specific manner-what to
challenge-is a starting point. The results of Buckley's conservative
political efforts, of course, speak for themselves. But it is still very
important to recall how it all began.
Buckley's title is a play on Booker T. Washington's
(1856-1915) autobiography, Up From Slavery, published in 1901.
Washington's life story is one of sheer determination and fortitude. As he
was born into slavery just before the Civil War began, his achievements were
attained in an era when society sought to hold him and his race down as a
matter of principle. When his work was done Washington had accomplished more
than his contemporaries would have imagined (he forged the Tuskegee
Institute into the great university it became) but less than he might have
had his race not been used against him. It appears, from the title reference
in Buckley's case, that the progress and achievement evidenced by the manner
of Washington's life was something Buckley wished to instill in the
conservative cadre, who were contending with a different form of slavery-an
economic
slavery defined in Hayek's The Road to
Serfdom (Chapter 13). By means of pure resolve and conviction,
neither Washington nor Buckley would be smothered by prejudice or
intimidation.
At the outset, Buckley sets himself up as an
arbiter of language-out of necessity and unapologetically. To advance their
contentions liberals choose to use not just words but emotionally crafted
specters of social disasters or their remedial opposite, brilliant
equalitarian fiscal options. In explaining why he dissects these flights of
fancy in rather blunt fashion Buckley feels constrained to make one of his
fundamental points:
The compulsion to soften (words and meaning) can be seen elbowing out
the desire to make oneself clear. . . . The modulated approach threatens
to overwhelm reality and truth. The human impulse to be tactful
evolutionizes
into a tendency to refuse to recognize facts.
As John Adams noted two hundred years ago "facts are stubborn
things," and Buckley is equally stubborn in recalling them when faced
with self-righteous, impractical, or utopian schemes to make the world over.
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While evincing much frustration with liberals who
deny reality Buckley continues to argue with them in an attempt to make
sense of things that exist only as a mirror image of truth. By way of
example, he describes-fifty years ago-what today is known as political
correctness. Being politically correct involves more than using emotionally
neutral wording, which often obfuscates personal responsibility; it also
entails the effort to camouflage behind such phrasing partisan political
goals that invariably revolve around full-scale government intervention
aimed at equalitarianism. This was something Buckley could not, throughout
his life, let pass unnoticed.
Another example of Buckley's foresight is his
discussion of "entitlements," a word that did not appear in Up
From Liberalism but the substance of which and its inexorable infliction
on our society he clearly envisions. The concept of "entitlements"
and their social effect was seen earlier in Frederic Bastiat's The
Law (Chapter 7) and will appear later in Bertrand de Jouvenel's The
Ethics of Redistribution (Chapter 28). Buckley takes the fears and
consternation of these authors through the course in logic now well-defined
by modern American political confrontations; in stating his philosophical
opposition to this brand of welfarism he preaches the law of unintended
consequences-of aid thoughtlessly given without consideration of its whole
effect. Although some may not care to give Buckley credit for being a
prophet, he pursues to their reasonable ends liberal tendencies in evidence
at the time he wrote and in so doing comes to what now look like inescapable
conclusions.
Buckley launches his investigation into social
welfarism (a main thrust of this book) on a foundational level. He observes
that at the base of a liberal's beliefs are assumptions that human beings
are perfectible, that social progress is predictable, and that equality is
attainable-all through the action of the state. The modern liberal still
claims that reason alone will lead us to successfully effect these goals.
This reflects a rebirth of the failed theorizing of France's
eighteenth-century Enlightenment. In his perennial fashion, Buckley
demonstrates that reason does precisely the opposite of what the liberals
claim. Actually, a blind faith in reason incongruously combined with gushing
sentimentality-unguided and unrestrained by intelligent thought,
rationality, or principle-is what causes liberals to feel so strongly and
yet be so wrong at the same time. Emotions and arrogance often drive
liberals to think they know the answers and can implement them through the
state-despite fact and experience.
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John Dickinson, one of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, puts it
succinctly in 1787 when he describes some of the less-than-benign structures
for national government that were being considered at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia:
Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us.
As well, this sentiment was noted centuries
before by Julius Caesar:
Experience is the teacher of all things.
Denying faith in reason seems almost blasphemous, but that is not what
Dickinson and Caesar are suggesting. What they offer is that man can intellectually
reason his way to seemingly rational answers that human beings cannot
willingly embrace. Man's reluctance to live only for his fellow man is not
based on selfishness-obviously a negative concept-but on self-preservation.
This latter reality is grounded on the idea that we are responsible for
ourselves and if each of us attends to that personal obligation (recalling
always the equal rights of others) we will achieve a greater good. Thus
reason is as beneficially applied in understanding human nature and
psychology as it is in imagining utopian possibilities. In recalling that
reason can take us to more than one answer Dickinson and Caesar are standing firm in
reality. In the modern era it is the fiction of idealism that Buckley
desires to address.
At mid-century Buckley saw the liberal political
leadership-for political gain-offering everyone everything that they might
need or could want. Moreover, if someone was not imaginative enough to
envision what he "needed," liberals would not hesitate to proffer
what they thought he should have. All of this was to be at the expense of
the government as though the government was some Midas-like entity separate
from the citizenry. It must be continually remembered that we taxpayers are
the government. Buckley argues that the continuing liberal largesse is a
crime of unbridled proportions. It is a crime against the recipients as much
as against those who are taxed to fund the irrational, but
pseudo-emotionally satisfying giveaways. Buckley's answer to such nonsense
is to note that
there will not be a robust political life until people become convinced
that it matters what they think.
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Then they must put their thoughts into action. The difference in the
views of conservatives and liberals can be found in the idea of how to
encourage a rational society. While each understands the value of the rule
of law there are different views of what those laws are intended to
accomplish; that same difference reflects the underlying philosophies of how
our governing is to be effected. Conservatives see law in its larger
context, as something that has to be applied to human circumstances-to what
is. Liberals see law as a tool, a lever, to force conformity to reasoned (in
their view) behavior-to what should be. For the liberal, if we lose our
sense of morality, rules will suffice. The human condition says otherwise.
In the second half of his book Buckley dissects
liberalism in its economic misapprehensions. He offers that the planned
economy was fostered by demagogic politicians and supported by an academic
aristocracy that derided any who were so bold as to disagree. This derision
occurs either through personal attacks or intellectual condescension (as
noted by George Gilder in Wealth and
Poverty [Chapter 27]). Fewer dollars should be spent by the people
themselves the liberal says, while more tax dollars should be spent on their
behalf because the good of the people is not to be decided by them but by
the political and academic cognoscenti. This centrally planned arrogance is
easy to debunk and yet it was and is so widely accepted in the liberal
political world and
mainstream media that it frustrates common intelligence (and all of this
takes place irrespective of the enormous success free markets attained after
World War II [see The Commanding
Heights, Chapter 29]). That so many people could be so misguided by
their own hubris is simply the human condition in its most ineffective
guise. It is human reason gone down a self-destructive path.
From his 1950s perch Buckley sees the
centralization of government as the looming problem of the twentieth
century. He intones that the more concentrated government becomes the more
mechanical our response is because government is too big and too far away to
do anything about. Apropos of this, he notes that the easiest way for
liberals to circumvent political obstacles-any hindrance that common sense
moves people on a local level to put in the liberal's path-is to create the
greatest possible distance between where a tax dollar is collected and where
it is spent. Liberals in Washington cunningly disburse ever-growing tax
receipts (or, worse, deficits) to localities where the question is not
"Is this a good program?" but "How can we obtain maximum
federal funding?" (Someone else is
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paying for it, right?) This changes
the first question that should be asked on the local level: is it proper
that we participate in this program at all, and if so, how do we attain
locally set goals reflecting local conditions?
The second and broader local query is whether these
tax dollars should go to Washington in the first place. Do we get revenue
and other advantages back in equal measure to what we are taxed and what we
truly need-even if considered in the broadest sense of the national public
interest? By sending its money off to Washington the electorate suffers a
loss from friction (the surcharge Beltway bureaucrats inevitably must levy
as a handling fee before sending local dollars back, reduced in size and
covered with regulatory gobbledygook) while being concomitantly subjected to
the vicissitudes of politics that misdirects tax dollars based on political
whims-or political power. The latter results in the "earmark"
scandals that are central to twenty-first-century congressional corruption.
(Earmarks are the application of Congressionally-appropriated funds to
specific districts or states at the behest of individual senators or
congresspersons.)
Liberal income redistribution schemes foisted on an
unsuspecting and often naive public are a target for Buckley's sharp pen and
incisive logic. Everyone loves a gift, and when it comes from the government
it is not only thought of as free it is actually touted as such. Buckley
marvels, as should we, that people can so consistently and completely act as
though the government actually has something other than what it takes from
us. There is no government money; there is only our money. How it is
used should guide our every public impulse.
In this vein, while he reviews the Social Security
program Buckley explodes all the myths of what it isn't and he exposes it
for what it actually is-income redistribution. The system will ultimately
fail because its interior financial logic is that of a pyramid scheme, where
the benefits for existing beneficiaries are taken from current workers-with
the hope by these contributors that there will be new workers to support
them as they retire. Social Security is an unfunded liability of the
government. When those workers fail to materialize the program will suffer
catastrophic financial collapse. It is a system that does social damage by
fostering irresponsible financial security expectations. That fact has come
home to roost in the twenty-first century as the U.S. Social Security
program faces near-term insolvency.
Buckley's considerations, as a group, call for the
reduction of federal centralization and aggrandizement, for elimination of
the idea
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that one-size-fits-all government is possible, and for the retention of tax dollars locally whenever possible so that those who are
affected see to the proper application of these funds. Citizens must be able to watch government as it
watches them and this can only be done on a local level.
What riles Buckley most, as noted in the opening
paragraph of this synopsis, is his fear of a liberalism that becomes more
coercive and more direct with each passing year as "the social planners
seek more and more brazenly to impose their preferences on us." The
taking of a dollar for taxes reduces the taxpayer's freedom incrementally
just as every other reduction of property rights does. (For a comprehensive
exploration of the equation that defines the incremental loss of liberty as
taxation rises, consult Property and
Freedom [Chapter 11], and Capitalism
and Freedom [Chapter 25].) In the end, Buckley asks how much we are
willing to give in before we simply give up. It is not an idle question. In
1835 in Democracy in America
(Chapter 8), after he details the long list of things government tends to do
for us if left unchecked, Alexis de Tocqueville asks,
[W]hat remains [for the people] but to spare them all the care of
thinking and all the trouble of living?
Reading Buckley's now half-century-old reflections provides some cogent
and thought-provoking answers to what happens to us when we surrender
responsibilities for ourselves and allow our lives to be remolded in the
liberal image.
About the Author
William F. Buckley, Jr. was born in New York City in 1925 and raised in
Connecticut. He attended Yale University and sparred with American liberals
continually from his undergraduate days until his death in 2008. In 1955, he
established and for the next thirty-five years served as editor of National
Review, one of America's preeminent conservative publications. He was
one of the founders of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), formed in response
to the liberal agenda of the 1960s. From 1966 to 1999 he hosted Firing
Line, a program devoted to intellectual give-and-take that was
television's longest-running show. He authored more than forty books of
political commentary, autobiography, fiction, and philosophy. His thousands
of speeches and less formal talks
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promoted his aim of getting people to
think, then act. From 1962 until his death he wrote a column titled On
the Right, syndicated in more than three hundred newspapers, where he
attempted to make sense of the political and economic life of this country
and of the world. Wrote the New York Times, "His most inimitable
pieces are those that skewer the people he doesn't like, of whom there is no
shortage."
Available from most online booksellers as a used book only, not currently
in print
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