Originally published: 1937, revised 1962
288 pages | Chapter 23
ECONOMICS OF THE FREE
SOCIETY
Wilhelm Ropke |
The first truth that strikes one about this book is historical: it was
suppressed and then banned in Nazi Germany at the start of World War II. The
freedom it espoused and substantiated as necessary for the establishment of
a viable economy simply frightened the Third Reich. The second verity is
subtle: a political and social balance-sometimes exquisite, sometimes
casual, never static-is necessary for a free economy to exist.
Achieving a free economy is not easy. As Wilhelm
Ropke demonstrates in this volume, democratic governments often suffer from
expansive and intrusive pseudo-melioristic impulses. These usually stem from
one of several causes: righteous indignation, a Mother Theresa complex,
"intellectual" arrogance, or just pure flights of economic fancy
for which no basis can be found in reality but which offer very real
political advantages. These inspirations always have some predictably
negative effect on the free-market capitalism that supports overall societal
success.
As is evident in other chapters of First
Principles, the devil of economic truth lies in the details. Ropke
offers in Economics of the Free Society what a free economy should look
like-warts and all. Although it is easy to explain where overweening
government goes wrong-as Frederic Bastiat, Henry
Hazlitt, and Milton Friedman do
in their efforts (Chapters 7, 24, 25 respectively)-it is not as easy to
describe just exactly what free-enterprise capitalism should look like.
Ropke sets the standard.
The lessons here are relatively simple, but like
those of Ludwig von
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Mises (Chapters 32 and 40)
they traverse almost the
entire landscape of economic reality to arrive at their conclusions. Ropke
reduces the complex to the understandable by effectively explaining the
interrelatedness of a free enterprise system's individual parts and how
those segments interact with political freedom. When we understand those
relationships we have an increased chance of avoiding the great pitfall of
intrusive government: the law of unintended consequences.
A recurrent theme in most of the literature about
man's attempts to govern himself provides Ropke's starting point:
The great risks implicit in an extreme dependence of all individuals in
society upon each other are tolerable in the long run only where an
efficiently administered legal system and an unwritten but generally
accepted code of minimum moral precepts assure to the participants . . .
that they will be able to carry on their activities in an atmosphere of
mutual confidence and security. Economic history is a constant
illustration of the truth that the intensity of economic activity rises or
falls in the degree to which these conditions are fulfilled. [Emphasis
added]
We see here a reprise of Russell Kirk's
narration of the history of morality in The
Roots of American Order (Chapter 4). In that book, Kirk establishes
that the unwritten rules of social
interaction, which are too many and too complex to codify, must persist
within everyone's understanding for a society to function. If these rules
are not uniformly assimilated there can be no faith in the system, nor can
people trust one another's judgment or integrity, nor, ultimately, can there
be any system at all. The two props upon which such an arrangement is
founded are enlightened self-interest and the Golden Rule (referring here,
in particular, to its practical application, not directly to its
pan-religious significance). These must guide human behavior. The political
ramification, if these understandings are present, is that government can be
quite limited. The people will turn only sparingly to the legislature and
will infrequently need to seek judicial recourse to settle disputes. Most
citizens will be able to resolve their controversies informally or, better
still, avoid them in the first place-because all are grounded in the same
reality.
After setting these moral foundations, so necessary
for a free society to exist, Ropke proceeds with an investigation of the
mechanisms
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that allow the free market to operate. His conclusions are
instructive in that they reveal the weave of the social and economic fabric,
the strength of which over centuries has proven capable of sustaining whole
cultures. By way of example, one of his longer and more arcane but important
chapters deals with money-the means of exchange and the structural
foundation of any economy. Although that sounds obvious and perhaps banal,
money is a complex entity and understanding its uses and effects is
essential to understanding all economic relations. The credit, or monetary,
system of any given economy can either stabilize or exacerbate inflationary
pressures whether they arise from economic, social, or governmental actions.
Controlling inflation is crucial to economic fitness. In the end, Ropke
wants his readers to accept the rudimentary importance of the monetary
system being used-that unless it is healthy there is no second step toward a
sound government or a sound society.
Another particularly valuable lesson, because it is
so current, is found in the way Ropke lays out the economics of a global
marketplace. He explains the operation of borderless economics; that is, a
free market that operates in the absence of a worldwide social and legal
system. The creation and implementation of a uniform international system of
laws, even one that relates only to commerce, is likely to remain a
practical and intellectual improbability for the foreseeable future. The
characteristics of a borderless system, on the other hand, are essentially
the same as those of a market within a single country-in each case
enlightened self-interest is always the key. Ropke observes that in the
field of international commerce where the enforcement of contracts is less
than certain and fraught with cultural (not to mention legal) obstacles,
integrity becomes more important than law. A lack of integrity to one's
promises results in commercial ostracism, probably a more devastating
punishment than mere legal responsibility. Ropke predicts the future of
international economic activity in the twenty-first century (which at the
time he wrote was more than six decades distant) with a prescience that
creates confidence in the remainder of his observations. Those who deride
efforts to make world trade efficient and reliable-efforts that help all
countries and all people-will benefit greatly from Ropke's explanation of
the practical side of global wealth creation.
When Ropke dissects international trade, he brings
the issue down to its core element: Global commerce is nothing more than a
process where
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exactly as with internal trade it rests on the division of labor and on
the exchange of goods resulting from this division of labor . . . . Foreign
trade is similar to a labor-saving machine or to any other method of
lowering the cost of production.
After observing isolationist tendencies in the less developed nations,
Ropke opines, "Poor countries can afford even less than rich ones to
shut themselves off from the world economy." An example: the division
of labor, by means of which poorer countries can obtain and benefit from
advanced technology that they cannot develop on their own, becomes a lever
that operates in both directions. The less developed nations supply raw
materials and labor in exchange for machinery and technology; both parties
to the transaction profit.
In today's climate of globalization, which is the
inevitable result of free trade and technological progress, applying the
principles of the free enterprise system to international markets is hardly
novel. After all, Adam Smith had discussed the benefits of global trade
nearly two hundred years earlier, in 1776 in Wealth
of Nations (Chapter 12). Ropke affirms and deepens Smith's insights,
an important effort for today's readers who may be overwhelmed by
protectionist cant and accusations of imperialist designs, accusations that
are almost invariably contrary to good sense and common experience, but
which are politically convenient and effective.
Because of the era in which he wrote, Ropke had to
dislodge socialistic thinking while presenting the fundamentals of a free
economy. Much of his book nevertheless still rings true in our time when
state welfarism and nascent attempts at global (not just national) wealth
redistribution offer trite and uniformly failed promises. As Ropke and many
others observe, socialism is simply an excess of intellect over experience.
For the modern reader the import of this old adage can be ignored only at
one's peril, for utopian ideals are reborn with every generation. Although
Ropke abbreviates his investigation of socialism for reasons of economy
(socialism, he observes, had been minutely examined by too many other
writers for him to iterate all its flaws), he often can't avoid enumerating
some of its deficiencies in order to explain the permutations of capitalism.
In a later era, Ronald Reagan succinctly expressed capitalism's essence in
1987 when he spoke at the Berlin Wall:
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Just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of
speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and
businessman enjoy economic freedom.
Ropke anticipated Reagan's insight with a penetrating question and its
answer:
Who is charged with seeing to it that the economic gears of society
mesh properly? Nobody.
And, of course, everybody. How much more simple could it be? Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" and Thomas Jefferson's admonition "that
government governs best which governs least" are both at work in a free
society's mostly uncontrolled economic system. Although constraints against
monopoly and against deceit, dishonesty, and corruption are indispensable,
an otherwise free economic system (born of a free market where the division
of labor is allowed to operate unimpeded) will bring the most of the best to
the greatest number of citizens. While the consumer sometimes needs
protection, such defense of his well-being must begin as his own personal
responsibility. It cannot be sought exclusively in rules and regulations and
legislation and judicial decisions. If individuals look to others for safety
the resulting protective measures soon become prescriptions, then demands,
and ultimately laws, which, of course, beget more laws because law is such
an inefficient mechanism to guide human behavior. This is all to the
detriment of freedoms, large and small. In spite of Benjamin Franklin's
intention to address freedom in the context of government, the essence of
his thoughts apply as well to ordinary economic life: "those who are
willing to give up a little [economic] freedom to obtain a little [economic]
security deserve neither."
If we ask the state to make us secure in our
financial lives rather than taking that responsibility upon ourselves we
give up our freedom on all issues that we abandon to the decisions, whims,
or desires of government functionaries. The incremental loss of freedom
eventually becomes a monumental, then a tyrannical loss. In the United
States, think of OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), which
tells us, as though common sense does not exist, how to use a ladder
("If you climb on this device you may fall and injure yourself.")
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or the believable but sardonic and
mythical twelve thousand pages of
regulations on the planting, growing, harvesting, selling, distributing, and
consuming of cabbage supposedly promulgated by the Agriculture Department.
How and how aggressively our government will proceed from these two
virtually insignificant (unless you are a cabbage farmer) but magnificently
distorting intrusions only Rube Goldberg or the Devil can imagine. We may be
certain, though, that the effects on our freedom will not be mythical.
In offering his overview of free-market economics
Ropke discusses wealth creation, the distribution of income, and monopolies.
The monopoly we call government actually means we the people since
the government has nothing, neither money nor power, unless it first gets
such from us. This monopoly causes the greatest distortions in any economy
by spending money (redistributing income) to cure discerned social ills.
Ropke sees this almost always as an exercise in welfarism. He holds that an
economist's (as opposed to a politician's) assessment of any such activity
would not pay attention to how worthy any particular ill is of being fixed
or even if it can be better fixed by leaving the citizens to their own
devices. Whether the ill is accidental, self-inflicted, or societally
induced is of no import. The critical matter for the economist to consider
(for that person is not a social engineer) is the creation of wealth. This
wealth has two purposes: it can be taxed to allow for the very public
expenditures that the political class thinks of as its own, while at the
same time it decreases the need for public expenditures because as wealth is
created there is increased employment, which means fewer government actions
are needed to care for the populace that now cares for itself.
According to Ropke, if taxes are not levied on this
wealth (or are kept low) then the gains to the individual (and thus the
society) become a vehicle through which all types of additional private
sector activity and solutions can occur. With this additional personal
income the economy is able to more efficiently address ills in myriad
ways-ways that the politician or bureaucrat often cannot or will not
see-while still ensuring the market continues to function. Many private
solutions to public issues (always voluntary in nature) are explored in
depth by Richard Cornuelle in Reclaiming
the American Dream (Chapter 30). Understanding Cornuelle's premise
reminds us of what we used to do as a society and how the state has
inappropriately co-opted the popular impulse toward charity or good works
and driven out both citizen sense and citizen participation in the bargain.
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Ropke sees most social engineers as oblivious to
these facts. The righteous see something "wrong" and they want a
remedy, usually through governmental intervention, meaning using
someone else's resources. (Just as often they are interested in achieving
some political end-either their own or that of their political party.) They
begin their involvement with the problem some distance from its genesis.
Ropke surmises that if they were to trace any given situation to its origin
they would see that it is likely amenable to alleviation through private
initiatives and at the local level where solutions can be tailored to
specific circumstances and defined populations.
In pursuing the ill and its resolution via
government action the social engineers will be faced with the challenge of
structuring the solution so it actually achieves the desired effect to
discourage the problem's persistence or recurrence. But the government's
action will also have to take into account the strong possibility of
unintended consequences from this new action that may unwittingly create
further ills. Of course, the initial ill very likely was an unintended
consequence of some previous government action. In the end, if those who see
government as the solution to anything were to delve to a problem's roots
they might humbly question whether the social benefit to be achieved by
governmental intervention would not be outweighed by damage done to other
parts of society. Structurally, government intervention (again, made
possible only through taxation) universally discourages the creation of
wealth and employment that in all likelihood could and would solve the
problem privately if left to its own devices. Ropke raises these relevant
questions as part of his study of the totality of economic, cultural, and
governmental relationships so that some type of practical analysis can be
brought to real-world problems.
In Ropke's hands, the topic of monopolistic
practices (the alleged existence of which is the subject of ever-present
assertions of the need for governmental intervention) seems less complex
than it might. The biggest threat to the market is not private monopoly but
government monopoly-almost no private monopolies exist except those that are
founded in and granted by action of the state. Ropke finds the
recommendations of some who wish to preclude potential capitalistic
monopolies (by means of more government regulations and control) even more
bizarre than the reasons given as to why the private tendency toward
monopoly is so supposedly dangerous in the first place. In point of fact,
monopolies don't tend to persist in a free market. As soon as someone
attempts to establish a monopoly,
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others replicate, imitate, improve upon
the
product or service, etc., so that the monopoly disappears. In Ropke's
hands, the discussion of monopolies is sensible, not emotional; rational,
not distorted by accusation of public harm unfounded in fact.
As it was in Ropke's era, the question today is not
whether the state will monopolize the means of production and distribution
but how the fruits of production and distribution will be taxed-and then
"used" for the citizenry. Taxation is obviously a government
monopoly. As the levels are reduced or increased the monopoly (on claiming
any given economy's wealth) issue arises: will the populace be free to order
their own world-will incentive be allowed to work its magic at all levels of
society?
The secondary issue stemming from Ropke's
discussion of monopolies concerns regulation of the economy. Should it be
regulated? If so, how and when? The answers in any given period define and
redefine the size and effect of the state. In his detailed analysis of these
phenomena Ropke investigates and exposes the myriad truths and myths of an
ordered economy in an attempt to make sense of how the legitimate interests
of the state and the individual should interact. (For an expanded discussion
of these two issues, see John Chamberlain's The
Roots of Capitalism [Chapter 26] and Charles Murray's In
Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government [Chapter 31].)
Some of the most interesting and arguably most
valuable few pages of this book present Ropke's reflections on the work of
an outsized twentieth-century economist, John Maynard Keynes, as Ropke
compares Keynes to the eighteenth century's Adam Smith. Keynes is probably
the best-known if not most talented economist of the era stretching from the
turn of the twentieth century to the end of World War II. He was at first
the darling of macroeconomists and political leaders because of his espousal
of inflationary deficit government spending as the antidote to devastating
boom-and-bust business cycles.
Politicians loved Keynesian economics because they
got to spend the public's money or to print money that had no justifiable
existence other than through Keynes's theories, and then claim a mantel of
care while doing so. Under the guise of doing a public good these
politicians got re-elected for doing exactly the wrong thing. Keynesian
economics was the politician's dream policy. Ultimately, though, he became
the bane of some of these same admirers when it was seen that this tool's
unintended consequences caused more problems than
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it solved. Ropke, finding Keynes's tenure on center stage bittersweet (recall, they were
contemporaries, talking to the same audiences), also detected him getting
full of himself (messianic is the word that Ropke uses) and in the process
doing even more harm when he moved from theorizing in an academic manner to
pontificating from political platforms.
Keynes and Keynesian economics crop up incessantly,
even today, and Ropke's assessment of how Keynes went wrong makes for useful
reading given all that we have learned about economics since his generation.
And the admonition again arises that although Keynesianism, like many other
-isms, may be defunct now, we must know it and recognize it as it is sure to
revive at some future time. (How that happens is a two-fold process: first,
there are still educational or theoretical materials in existence that
people will find and mistakenly or naively believe are true, no matter how
false they have been proven to be; second, there are few elected or
bureaucratic officials who will not hear the siren song of the free lunch
Keynesianism seems to offer. They are drawn to it as alchemists were drawn
to the possibility of turning lead into gold in the Middle Ages.)
Ropke's goal was to offer comprehensive and
comprehensible observations about the fundamentals of a stable economy. He
describes a national economy in detail, then meshes that with international
trade, and proceeds to show the effects of various policies on each. He
explains the factors of production and takes pains to analyze capital
(generally meaning money), always the most ephemeral and misunderstood
element in any economy. His discussion of a country's fiscal assets and
policies provides a useful perspective on capitalism's most valuable and
pervasive and perhaps most maligned tools. He examines population size in
relation to the division of labor, compulsory unionism versus the right to
contract freely, speculators (a group about whom Ropke offers a particularly
useful analysis), the monetary and credit system, the attention-grabbing
problem of inflation, and many other factors common to all large, complex
economies. In sum, he omits little in his coverage of economic realities.
Ropke's penchant for citing particulars and details facilitates his
demonstration of how an amorphous yet interconnected system of production,
distribution, and consumption works efficiently only when left to its own
devices. Push in at one place and inevitably the system pushes back or
becomes skewed in another. Hence, we have to be careful how we intrude.
Understanding all of these details makes a
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citizen out of a taxpayer.
Without the knowledge and experience offered in Ropke's full but simplified
analysis, people often remain victims of government, and politicians, rather
than masters.
In his overview, Ropke steps back to look at the then-ongoing war between
capitalism and collectivism/socialism. He acknowledges that he didn't take
socialism to task in a thorough manner, because this collectivist aberration
was widely recognized as a failed philosophy, defensive of an insupportable
economic structure. He concludes that
these degenerate aspects [the arguments in favor of socialism] are so
obvious to everybody, they are the subject of such an extensive and
overly emotional literature, that it is the duty of the scholar to emphasize
the other side of the picture and to lead the discussion back to an
understanding of the foundations of our economic system.
If one is interested in the details, goals, and
methods of socialism, Ludwig von Mises's Socialism
(Chapter 32) is probably the most comprehensive (and understandable)
critique of the scores and scores of books on the character of socialist
philosophy. Mises wrote Socialism in 1922, yet the manner in which he
covers the entire subject remains as alive and valid today as it was then.
As has been previously observed, the reader needs to be versed in these
matters because in the current era socialist thinking is the impetus behind
the welfare state. The mechanics are somewhat different (and only somewhat)
but the goal and the effect are not. The bankrupt logic of the welfare state
is nothing but the same heedless understandings of socialism repackaged for
the twenty-first century. A volume that meshes well with those of both Ropke
and Mises is Richard Pipes's Property
and Freedom (Chapter 11). Pipes's work provides an understanding of
the necessary conjunction between the substance of capitalism (which is
property) and freedom-the essence of the human experience.
Ropke evinces a belief that if people simply
understood capitalism better they would reject socialism, and by inference
the welfarism so popular with generous and self-serving politicians. We
daily witness the undeniable harm done by a culture of dependency, by
"entitlements," by the ubiquitous attitude that nothing that goes
wrong is our fault, and by the quasi-religious faith that a lot more
government will fix almost anything. Demagoguery along these lines-that the
wealthy,
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the corporations, and the internationalists vex us with various
afflictions because they are greedy-denies economic facts.
Although today's enemies of capitalism and freedom
do not generally aim to overthrow our economic system they do advocate
defiance of the principles on which it operates (and, in the bargain, common
sense) thus adding further to a thorough misunderstanding of its
capabilities. In the end, if the demagogues do enough damage they will
innocently claim that they were just trying to do the right thing, without
understanding in the least how they did exactly the wrong thing. The further
Americans get from seeing through the misleading dogma of statist fanatics
the greater the chance that they will make a wrong turn and find only a dead
end as they seek a short cut to some supposedly quantifiable concept of
"social justice," or even the proverbial free lunch.
“Social justice” is obviously a concept intended to sound virtuous.
It is presented without much explanation or what it would look like
once attempted, or even what it would take to achieve if it could be
defined. In modern politics it
has come to serve as the liberal’s universal attack phrase.
Yet it must be recognized that actions taken to find an ephemeral end
such as this empowers only government, not the people who are thoughtlessly
intended to be aided. There is a
simple reason government is unqualified to be an arbiter of something as
unquantifiable as “social justice:” any attempt would be no more
perfect, or wise, or even fair than are the ever-changing politicians and
bureaucrats who would be in charge at any given time.
The corruption of personal freedom that must be evident with the idea
of giving government the control of an individual’s life or property is so
obvious that the larger picture is often missed in the false but feel-good
atmosphere that decries differences of any sort.
Subjective determination of supposed equality, clothed as “social
justice,” could be based on only one factor, as ephemeral as the idea
itself: fairness. Unfortunately
fairness is a concept that is never more than opinion.
The follow-on questions are not addressed: fair to whom, fair in what
measure, what logical and even unintended consequences will follow?
The inquiry is never made of how much harm is there to the individual
when someone else’s view of fairness stands to be imposed.
The opposite question is also never asked: how much can be taken from
those who supply the resources to achieve “social justice,” and what
happens to the system when we begin to take more than that group
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thinks is
fair to them. The “social
justice” paradigm is the foundation of
class warfare, a political tool theoretically abandoned in
America
when individual freedom became the basis of the national compact.
When opinion morphs into a claim of “social” justice, or right, with
the power of state enforcement, it becomes simultaneously politically
correct and socially destructive. In
even offering a goal of “social justice” the ideas of post-democratic
socialists/liberals become apparent: it is to elevate their idea of
government above politics—to make life, via political proclamation and
bureaucratic control, more than what it is or can be: equal by all measure.
Government concentration and centralization at the federal level, and
then at the state level, where dreams of a perfect world are seen in
everyday pronouncements, fail to grasp everyday reality.
“Social justice”
is yet another concept that defies principle and thus one that must be
factually confronted where its false premises arise.
The final piece of Ropke's explication of the
free-enterprise system addresses the dangerous and widespread economic
illiteracy he witnessed (one of the three motivating concerns of First
Principles, the other two being constitutional illiteracy, and
moral/ethical bewilderment and corruption founded in political correctness
and moral relativism). Economic illiteracy allows simplistic and inadequate
answers to complex social realities to seem credible. Ropke makes the point
that people don't take the time to understand capitalism and its
indispensable foundation, the
open society. The polity seems to indulge in an almost willful blindness or
laziness:
The first duty of an economist [or a citizen] . . . is to establish an exact
understanding of two things: the economic system which we have and
the one which we would establish in its place . . . [so] we will have a
full awareness of all that we would give up, and all that we would
receive, in choosing the one or the other.
After exhorting both the teachers and the students to learn, to expel
ignorance, Ropke notes a serious difficulty:
It is, indeed, disquieting to find how small a minority in any country
really understands the essence of our economic system. . . . That the
number is so small is in itself a cause for concern, since the
overwhelming
majority of those who
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are engaged in passing random judgments on our economic system seek
disparage the minority who do understand it as ignorant and biased-a
spectacle to be met with in no other science.
[Emphasis added]
The italicized clause speaks to a continuing problem manifest in the
growing divisiveness when public debate regarding economic issues ensues.
Specifically, the "passing random judgments" thought applies to
two groups of people. The first group encompasses various activists,
pundits, "experts" (whether or not they actually are),
editorialists, broadcast news readers, and politicians-all of whom are often
guilty, to one degree or another, of passing economic fallacy off as gospel.
Some do this out of ignorance, some for ignoble reasons.
In the second group appear the victims, the
often-duped voters who respond to the economic representations advanced by
members of the first group that may or may not have any validity. The second
group's economic ignorance is obviously the major contributing factor to the
efficacy of the first group's designs, for economic ignorance allows
demagoguery to flourish. The often fanatic speakers frequently pontificate
in naive terms of justice and fairness, neither of which is as easily
achieved or as black and white as the lecturer would have us believe. Too
many of us allow ourselves to be led, almost to the exclusion of making our
own decisions, because we don't take the time to understand economic
fundamentals. Without that understanding, we can do little but accept the
judgments visited upon us. At the most basic level this is often abetted by
the repetition of false premises. As Vladimir Lenin, leader of the 1917
Russian Revolution observed "A lie repeated often enough becomes the
truth." Thus is the circle closed.
While Ropke covers the essentials of free
enterprise in a reasonably comprehensive manner, he intentionally leaves
some gaps so as not to confuse the subject with too many details. The
interested reader may complete an investigation of free market economics by
reading Ludwig von Mises's The
Theory of Money and Credit (Chapter 34). Although Mises's title
sounds daunting, his prose is clear and expressive. His book remains
surprisingly useful despite the fact that it was written almost a century
ago.
Ropke's readers should be aware that he uses the
words liberal and collectivist in their traditional European meanings as he
juxtaposes his views and understandings in relation to various economic
configurations. His is one of those books written by early twentieth-century
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European authors that uses the word liberal in the same sense that conservative or
classical liberal is used in the U.S. today. Ropke's use of
"collectivist" generally corresponds to "socialist" in
modern parlance.
About the Author
Born in Hanover, Germany at the very end of the nineteenth century, Wilhelm
Ropke-the man and the philosopher-was a product of twentieth-century
excesses. The son of a physician, his upbringing was grounded in traditional
Protestant teachings whose influence on his thinking appears over and over
in his work. He fought as a soldier in the trenches during World War I; as a
result of that brutal experience he sought to understand the causes of such
devastating conflicts, thus he pursued the study of economics and sociology.
(To understand how the same circumstances could lead to a completely
opposite personal course that also had profound public consequences, see Witness
[Chapter 41] by Whittaker Chambers, a contemporary of Ropke.) Upon receiving
his doctorate Ropke became a professor in Germany.
Ropke's reputation as an individualist thinker was
well earned. He was not afraid to look at first causes; his ability and
drive to do so marked his career and works. He taught in Germany until he
was forced to leave the country in 1932 because of his outspoken opposition
to Nazism. He resided in Istanbul and taught at the university there from
1932 until 1937. He then returned to Europe and began a career at the
Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, where he embarked
on a collaborative professional life with Ludwig von Mises. Although von
Mises emigrated early in World War II, Ropke remained in Geneva throughout
the Second World War and for the rest of his academic life.
Ropke, along with von Mises, Frederich von Hayek,
Milton Friedman, and others who were ultimately awarded Nobel Prizes in
economics, formed the Mont Pelerin Society in Switzerland in 1947. Their
intent was to publicize the folly of collectivism and to decry socialist
ideology and its increasing erosions of liberty. The philosophy of the Mont
Pelerin Society succeeded in spite of the fears of its founders and exceeded
even the most optimistic of its members' expectations. Ropke married in 1924
and raised three children with his wife, Eva. He died in 1966.
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