Originally published: 1946
214 pages | Chapter
24
ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON
Henry Hazlitt |
Henry Hazlitt wrote Economics in One Lesson at the end of World War
II because he was disturbed about the course of economic discussion inside
and outside of government. What he knew to be economic fallacies were then
so accepted they were skewing policy debates from the outset, thus making it
virtually impossible to arrive at a rational and productive free-market
paradigm. In his description of what he observed in 1946, Hazlitt uses
phrases such as "false premises," "fantastic
conclusions," and "economic absurdities." He so effectively,
and timelessly, exposes the wrong-headed notions then prevalent in economic
thinking that Economics in One Lesson has been in print for more than
half a century and has sold millions of copies in more than half a dozen
languages. His lessons are well worth revisiting.
Hazlitt takes the economic mis-assumptions of his
era (which often exist in their mistaken glory yet today) to their logical
conclusions to see if they make sense. In so doing, he pays close attention
to the law of unintended consequences. He proceeds to lay bare the nonsense,
unfairness, destructiveness, and even silliness of what often passes for
sophisticated economic thinking. His observations, coming close on the heels
of Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (Chapter 13), provided Main
Street substance to Hayek's academic and psychological acumen. Hazlitt
contends "the whole of economics can be reduced to a single lesson, and
that lesson can be reduced to a single sentence":
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The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate
but at the larger effects of any act or policy: it consists in tracing the
consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.
[Emphasis in original]
The question becomes: why do so many bad
policies seem to have so much traction with both the public and
political/governmental functionaries? Hazlitt observes: "The reason is
that the demagogues and bad economists are presenting half-truths. They are
speaking only of the immediate effect of a proposed policy or its effect
upon a single group. As far as they go they may often be right." He
notes that in the bigger picture, when bad logic is applied to all times and
all groups it creates worse policy-which then causes economic distortion, if
not disaster.
The beauty and readability of Hazlitt's prose lies
in the commonsense simplicity of his explanations and examples. Hazlitt's
purpose in investigating small-scale economics by means of these examples
was to provide a frame of reference, to set the stage so the reader could
consciously make the transition to large-scale considerations. What Hazlitt
ultimately demonstrates is the loss to the economy through government
intervention-by means of taxes, laws, and regulations-that cause distorted
and reduced economic activity. The funds that might have been created if the
economy was allowed the freedom under which it was designed to operate are
lost to the citizen and ultimately to the government because the pie from
which both can gain their
resources is smaller. (George Gilder expands on this relationship in Wealth
and Poverty [Chapter 27]).
Obviously some government is both necessary and
valuable and if government controlled its spread and reach, as James Madison
in particular designed it to do, the system would work to society's benefit.
What Hazlitt comments on is that government not only does not effect
self-control, it does pretty much the opposite. (To review the everyday
realities of how and why this happens recall Bertrand de Jouvenel's
five-step circular political process in On Power
[Chapter 15]).
When Hazlitt expands his investigation to
macroeconomics he begins with an observation he considers primary in then
current circumstances: "There is no more persistent and influential
faith in the world today than the faith in government spending." Such
thinking, inspired by economist John Maynard Keynes, Hazlitt calls the
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most
fundamental fallacy of his time. This judgment remains as apt today as when
Hazlitt first expressed it. While Americans watch tax receipts continuously
fall short of government spending the federal debt lurches toward one
hundred ten trillion
dollars. As this spending seems not to have had a substantial effect on the
underlying problems toward which, decade after decade, trillion after
trillion, these funds are directed, Hazlitt's commentary on the dangers of
over-sized government remain more than topical.
For Hazlitt, the negative economic consequences of
any government's interventions in the marketplace-whether through government
spending or regulation or taxation, etc.,-are cumulative and
self-perpetuating. The progression is thus: first, government procures its
funds through taxation. Hazlitt observes that the value of those funds
diminishes when they pass through the collecting bureaucracy because of the
expense of the bureaucracy itself. This cost, which Hazlitt calls friction,
significantly lessens the economic benefit to society of whatever government
purpose is afoot. Then government uses the remaining tax dollars to set up
an additional bureaucracy for each program it creates. All of these actions
have a negative impact on both the freedom experienced by the public (it is
less at liberty to dispose of its own wealth) and the free market's ability
to perform its magic (it is less able to take advantage of the multiplier
effect of ordinary economic activity because there are fewer resources with
which to multiply). Of course, if the government simply spends money it has
not collected in taxes, by means of deficit spending, the negative effects
already described by Hazlitt are merely compounded by the inflation such
spending causes and the additional interest cost thus created.
Economic dampening is the far more important
consequence of intrusive government activity; the money diverted from the
people by taxation precludes them from using those funds as they would have
had they not been taken in the first place. But, based simply on the math,
he further explains that
for every public job created . . . a private job has been destroyed….
These financial diversions directly skew the economy in a relatively
straightforward manner. Since the people who act to create private
enterprise end up paying more to achieve their goals-because they have to
support the cost of their efforts and pay the cost of government
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endeavors simultaneously-the amount they produce decreases and the
concomitant multiplier effect of their private effort is reduced. Because
there is now less economic activity to tax government revenues decrease as
well. In the worst case scenario the entrepreneur abandons his goals
altogether
because too many of the funds that would have served his private purposes
have been taken for some public one. Taxation can actually eliminate a new
wing on a factory or a new line of production or a new research effort and
all the jobs (and additional tax revenues) that would have been created by
either effort.
The cascade of negative effects caused by this
cycle continues unabated. Hazlitt observes that public employment, which was
a tool of choice and a substantial part of government enterprise in
Hazlitt's time, does not bring to the economy what an entrepreneur might. In
the aftermath of the government's failed efforts to combat the effects of
the Great Depression of the 1930s it became clear that public largesse suppresses
the economic initiative and even the capability of those who receive it.
Such spending creates a perverse public dependency almost equal in
proportion to the amount of benevolence it theoretically dispenses.
In Hazlitt's opinion it is also important to
consider the bureaucracy itself. It is not benign-merely a conduit that
extracts a fee for its service. It is created as an infant but grows into a
behemoth for two simple reasons: first, because it can, and second, because
it must. In the first instance a bureaucracy grows as it finds more and more
clients who "need" additional assistance. These new avenues are
ubiquitous and are also a form of job security for the administrators. The
administrative entity begins to swell-because it can be more helpful than
was initially thought, at least in the minds of the bureaucrats. It also
serves a dual purpose of the legislators who seek to please the public
through political entrepreneurship; not only do their bureaucratic efforts
satisfy myriad constituencies, but of more value, the politician obtains
re-election in the bargain because he appears to be doing so much that is
good.
Later the bureaucracy grows because it obtains
sanctified or even holy status-its job is no longer just to assist, but to
deliver that to which the people have become "entitled." Thus it
must be given more authority and money because it too does so much that is
good. Once entitlement status is achieved then the protections offered by
the originally benevolent agency are changed in character from help to
obligations. Obligations create rights that are protected by further
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layers
of bureaucratic or even judicial oversight. The cycle has become fully
self-perpetuating at that point.
In order to learn how what he was experiencing in
1946 had come to pass Hazlitt goes back a generation; he explores and then
explains why President Franklin Roosevelt was not able to tax and spend the
United States out of the Great Depression. Indeed, as Hazlitt (and many
others since then) makes clear, Roosevelt's policies extended the
Depression's effects far beyond what was necessary. It was frequently stated
that the country was "spared" (if one dares to voice that result
considering the price paid for such an exemption) another decade of economic
failure only by the advent of World War II and its massive calls for
military production and national employment. His exposition vis-à-vis the
Depression is one of the core lessons of Hazlitt's study. His explanation of
the true cost of government's forced transfer of economic resources is a
straightforward and commonsense approach to comprehending the negative
effect and substantial expense-economic and human-of government intervention
in the marketplace.
Hazlitt was especially disturbed by the notion that
only government is large enough to tackle major projects, projects that
private industry supposedly cannot afford or does not have the will to
undertake because of the potential complications beyond financial woes. What
the theorists and pundits often either miss or ignore, muses Hazlitt, is
that the government has no money except what the private sector creates. It
is an old saw that bears repeating as a mantra, "We, the people, are
the government; the money of the government is our money." The
necessary conclusion is that if the private sector cannot afford a project,
the government cannot either. It is the coercive ability of government to
force such efforts that allows them to happen. Whether that results in good
or bad choices is usually a matter for posterity to determine.
Hazlitt brings forth at several points this core
lesson: each dollar taken for a governmental purpose is one dollar less that
is available for a private effort; and each private effort thus foiled has a
cumulative negative impact on the whole economy. If the government has no
money save what it takes from the citizens, Hazlitt inquires, why can't the
citizens simply use their fiscal resources for any worthy purpose-and
circumvent the added burden of government inefficiency and growth or claimed
omnipotence?
It was just a question. Hazlitt, however, does not
take these possibilities to the extreme conclusion that we need no
government any more than do other conservative thinkers. But he does want to
consider re-
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drawing the arena in which government is primarily
responsible-to make it smaller and more reasonable in all possible ways.
Concomitantly, Hazlitt seeks to enlarge avenues open to the private sector
by removing government monopolies and impediments to private activity.
In following economic fallacies through to their
logical conclusions Hazlitt exposes some of the negative consequences of
large government enterprises such as public housing and federal lending. He
refutes the bizarre claim that there are purported economic benefits of such
program's inefficiencies-that somehow inefficiency has a positive economic
multiplier effect resulting in more jobs being created to do the same amount
of work. Obviously, inefficiency is inefficiency. Government inefficiency is
doubly insulting because it is the taxpayer's money being taken and those
funds are being collected to allow more government and more government
waste, which then requires more resources, ad nauseum.
In his analysis Hazlitt also explains the
destructiveness of tariffs, price supports, rent control, and minimum wage
laws among other legislative adventures. He clearly defines the risks we
incur when we naively ask or allow government to take our wealth for
ostensibly noble purposes. Government is no more capable than the people in
this arena and, unfortunately, no less venal on occasion as legislators and
bureaucrats serve their own purposes.
Hazlitt reserves his harshest criticism for the
inflationary consequences of many of these government actions. In his view,
inflation is the most dangerous repercussion of fallacious economic
thinking. Hazlitt uses Depression-era Germany as an example of the extreme
case. Germany could not both support itself and pay the war reparations
forced on it at the end of World War I. (Germany's debt to
Britain
and France
alone
was set at $2.4 trillion in 2012 dollars). This crushing economic burden was
resolvable only through the German government spending money it did not have
and could not raise. Eventually the country's currency became worthless-at
one point it took a wheelbarrow full of paper money to buy a loaf of bread.
It was then Germany threw off its guilt and became once again belligerent.
The few steps from outrage to arms were easily taken in the hands of the
demagogic Adolph Hitler. Hazlitt's comprehension and explanation of why all
these things happen within any nation, not just the U.S., is not just
instructive, it is literally a call to action.
Through Hazlitt's exposition it becomes clear that
if each citizen does not personally engage in economic and governmental
processes
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entirely predictable consequences will result. He concludes that
our problems stem not so much from a lack of understanding of basic
economics but rather from our society's political inability to own up to
basic tasks. High-level government officials should
not be ignorant when they come into office. Their experience and education
should not allow them to act as they do, but their fealty to noblesse
oblige (literally the "obligation of the nobility") or their
own agenda seems to overwhelm what they should know to be true. The schemes
they develop for the redistribution of wealth tend to smother incentive and
foster a culture of dependence (as common understanding dictates they should
realize) and these results lead to impoverishment at every level of society.
That this happens again and again is the ubiquitous human condition in full
flower.
It is this human element that Hazlitt brings to the
forefront by emphasizing the inability of politicians to see both sides of
the coin-not just the pain of the less able, but the dignity of the
self-sufficient. Rather than using the lowest common denominator approach to
bring the successful down in a futile attempt to create economic equality,
Hazlitt proposes increasing and improving the available opportunities for
the less prosperous. This would occur by removing government impediments in
the marketplace, often disguised as government assistance programs, or more
accurately, "entitlements." His views and methods bear repeating
in each generation, and the simplicity of his investigation makes his
exposition the most useful point at which to begin.
About the Author
Henry Hazlitt was a journalist, literary critic, economist, philosopher, and
author. Born in 1894, his life spanned the American Century and his
interests mirrored our sometimes-fractured history. He lived to be 98, dying
in 1993, and was still amazed at the end of his life that of all his works Economics
in One Lesson was his most successful. His personal favorite was The
Foundations of Morality in which he investigates why ethical behavior is
so fundamental to human interaction.
Hazlitt received no training as an economist and did not graduate from
either college or high school. Obviously self-taught, he demonstrates what
can be done with a sound intellect and a commonsense approach to the facts.
He was more inclined toward the fields of ethics and philosophy than
economics but he profoundly affected world-wide economic practice through
his straightforward attack on economic
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illiteracy. Hazlitt was probably the
person most responsible for the fame of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von
Hayek by means of his reviews of their books. (The works of both Hayek and
Mises are presented elsewhere in this volume.)
Hazlitt published his first book before he reached
the age of 20 and landed a job as a stenographer at the Wall Street
Journal shortly thereafter. He traveled within literary and newspaper
circles most of his career. His penchant for standing on principle earned
him a reputation for integrity but cost him some of his more lucrative
employments when his philosophy was faced with economic absurdities he could
not allow to pass without comment, or even argument. Hazlitt wrote a score
of books and millions of words in editorials, reviews, articles, and
commentary pieces. His indefatigable devotion to freedom made his presence
on the American scene a thorn in the side of statists and a boon to
rationality in economic and political pursuits.
Available through:
Three Rivers Press, Div. of Crown Publishing
201 E. 50th Street
New York, NY 10022
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